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The terrorist attack in Stockholm on April 7th was perpetrated by a citizen of Uzbekistan. Pre-
viously, on April 3rd an ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan holding Russian citizenship conducted 
an attack on the subway in Saint Petersburg. These attacks were preceded by other large scale 
terrorist attacks conducted by Islamic radicals from Central Asia within the last 12 months. 
It shows the rising potential of radical Islamic groups and organisations originating from the 
countries of the region. Within Central Asia itself the level of the terrorist threat is low, owing 
to mass surveillance and widespread persecution of independent Islamic groups by the au-
thoritarian regimes of regional states. These actions, however, led to radicalisation of individ-
uals and entire groups, followed by them leaving the country to join Islamic terrorist organisa-
tions abroad (previously in Afghanistan and Pakistan, currently in Syria and Iraq). During the 
last decade, Islamic radicals from Central Asia were engaged in terrorist activities worldwide 
– from the USA, through Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria, to Turkey and countries of the Eu-
ropean Union. The trend of radicalised individuals migrating outside of Central Asia will most 
likely increase in the future, due to demographic pressures in the region, rising authoritarian 
tendencies and the scale of persecution. Therefore, the terrorist threats arising for European 
Union from the radical Islamic militants from Central Asia will probably also increase. 
Historical overview – evolution 
and globalisation 
Central Asian Islamic terrorism is not a new phe-
nomenon – its origins can be traced back to the 
breakdown of the USSR and independence of the 
region’s states. Since that time it underwent a sig-
nificant evolution – from local, grassroots groups 
to important international terrorist organisations. 
During the first period (1990-2000), radical Is-
lamic groups and organisations (out of which 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – IMU 
– became the primary one) were focused pri-
marily on attempts to start an Islamic revolu-
tion in the region1. Following the end of the civil 
1 The begging of the radical Islam in Central Asia described 
further in: S. Zapaśnik, „Walczący Islam” w Azji Central-
nej – problem społecznej genezy zjawiska, Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2006.
war in Tajikistan, and IMU’s failed attempts to 
provoke an Islamic revolution in the Ferghana 
Valley (the so-called Batken raids in 1999 and 
2000), radical Islamic militants moved to the 
Taliban-controlled region of north Afghani-
stan. While based in Afghanistan, IMU became 
an important ally of the Taliban – for example, 
one of IMU’s founders, Juma Namangani, led 
the Taliban defence against the coalition forces 
in 2001. After the American intervention, IMU 
militants fled to Pakistan’s Waziristan, where 
they entered into the complex system of local 
Pashtun tribal allegiances2. During this time the 
organisation split – with some of its members 
establishing the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). IMU’s 
2 Further in: D. Witter, Uzbek militancy in Pakistan’s tribal 
region, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/
files/BackgrounderIMU_28Jan.pdf 
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escape to Pakistan was the end of a direct pres-
ence of Islamic terrorist organisations in the 
region, yet the phenomenon of Central Asian 
Islamic terrorism did not cease. 
The second phase of growth of the radical Is-
lamic organisations from Central Asia began 
during their stay in Pakistan and lasted until 
2014. During this time both IMU and IJU be-
came an important element of the international 
Islamic terrorist conglomeration present in Pa-
kistan and at its peak numbered up to several 
thousand members (militants and their fam-
ilies). While maintaining their bases in North 
Waziristan, these organisations have fought 
against the Pakistani forces and subcontract-
ed for larger terrorist organisations. The latter 
activity first of all included fighting the war in 
Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban. The IMU 
succeeded in launching an insurgency in the 
previously tranquil northern Afghanistan, while 
the US forces viewed IMU militants as better 
trained and more dangerous than the Taliban3. 
Secondly, there was activity in Europe on be-
half of Al Qaeda – IMU operatives attempted 
to perpetrate large scale terrorist attacks in the 
EU member states in 2007 and 2010, as well as 
in 2012 in the US. However, in all of these cases 
they were thwarted during the planning stage4. 
IMU and IJU were also pioneers in large scale 
recruitment of Islamic radicals from Europe5. 
3 A. Feitt, Countering the IMU in Afghanistan, http://
smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/386-
feitt.pdf
4 h t tp : / / w w w. sp i e g e l .d e / i n t e r na t i o na l /g e r ma -
ny/0,1518,730377,00.html; https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2010/mar/04/islamic-jihad-union-bomb-plot 
5 Further in: J. Lang, Radical Islamic militants of Central 
Asia, OSW Report, 13.11.2013, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/sites/default /files/report_the-radical-islamic-mili-
tants.pdf
Both the organisations regarded Central Asia 
mainly as a source of new recruits, rather than 
a theatre for armed struggle or terrorist actions 
(an exception to this was the two attacks per-
petrated by IJU in Uzbekistan in 2004)6. 
The second phase in the history of radical Islam-
ic militants from Central Asia ended along with 
the intensification of the war in Syria and the 
change in Islamabad’s policy towards some of 
the international terrorist organisations active 
in the Pakistani tribal areas. A significant part of 
IMU and IJU’s militants have left for Syria, while 
the above organisations were forced to flee Wa-
ziristan in the autumn of 2014, as a result of the 
Pakistani offensive7. In 2015, IMU’s emir at the 
time – Usman Gazi – announced that the move-
ment had joined the Islamic State (IS) 8, which 
in Afghanistan consists of local Islamic radicals 
who are in conflict with the Taliban9. In October 
of 2015, Usman Gazi, along with a few remain-
ing IMU militants, was killed by the Taliban in 
the Afghani province of Zabul10. This de facto 
meant the end of the IMU11. IJU’s capability 
also significantly decreased due to the exodus 
of militants and sponsors to Syria, although the 
group remains active on the side of the Taliban 
in Afghanistan (for example, the involvement of 
IJU militants in the seizure of Kunduz in 2015) 12. 
Syria – a game changer
The war in Syria and Iraq has significantly al-
tered modern Islamic terrorism, with radical 
Islamic militants from Central Asia being no ex-
ception. The conflict in Syria has, on the one 
6 Ibidem. In March and April 2004 IJU launched attacks 
against government targets in Tashkent and Bukhara. 
7 Operation Zar-e Zarb which was launched as a response 
to militant attacks, including the IMU raid on the Kara-
chi airport.
8 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74471
9 In the case of IMU it was Mansura Dadullah’s group.
10 http://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-islamic-move-
ment-uzbekistan-fractured/27395160.html
11 Information about IMU’s reactivation in Afghanistan is 
periodically reoccurring, yet it is hard to ascertain the 
scale, which might be very small. 
12 J. Lang, Nervousness in Central Asia after the Taliban 
seize Kunduz, OSW Analyses, 14.10.2015, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-10-14/ner-
vousness-central-asia-after-taliban-seize-kunduz
Central Asian Islamic terrorism is not 
a new phenomenon – its origins can be 
traced back to the breakdown of the 
USSR and independence of the region’s 
states.
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hand, led to the decline of old organisations 
among the Central Asian radical Islamic mil-
itants, yet it has also popularised traveling to 
the region to engage in jihad, and established 
a wide array of new organisations and groups. 
Since the outbreak of war in 2011, between 
2 and 5 thousand volunteers from Central Asia 
have left for Syria and Iraq, where they joined 
radical Islamic organisations13. Most important-
ly, for the first time travelling outside of the 
region to fight in the ranks of militant and ter-
rorist organisations became a mass phenome-
non. The largest exodus of volunteers to Syria 
was seen in 2014 following the successes of Is-
lamic State. A combination of several process-
es and circumstances led to establishment of 
the above phenomenon on such a large scale. 
Amongst them the most important ones are: 
the rise of importance of the Salafi communi-
ties, the negative socio-economic situation in 
the regional states, effective propaganda dis-
seminated by the organisations active in Syria, 
combined with the spread of social media in 
the region, and lastly the ease of getting to the 
war-zone via Turkey. It is difficult to reconstruct 
a profile of a typical Central Asian volunteer 
due to the diversity of those travelling to Syria 
– the only common ground is the Islamic factor 
(usually, but not exclusively, Salafism)14. 
While in Syria, the radical Islamic militants from 
Central Asia have established terrorist organi-
sations of their own, as well as having joined 
the ones already present there – mainly Islamic 
State. The most important organisations creat-
ed by the militants from Central Asia include: 
Jamaat Imam Bukhari, Katibat Seyfullah or Kat-
ibat Tawhid wal Jihad, all of which are linked to 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly Jabhat an-Nusra), 
13 It is difficult to pinpoint an exact number, due to differ-
ent methodologies in place. For instance, the number of 
citizens of particular states who left for Syria and Iraq 
includes also militants’ families as well as those killed. 
14 For further reading about reasons for leaving to Syria, 
see: M. Falkowski, J. Lang, Homo Jihadicus. Islam in the 
former USSR and the phenomenon of the post-Soviet 
militants in Syria and Iraq, OSW Report, 21.09.2015, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/homojihadi-
cus.pdf
as well as Jamaat Sabiri, which is part of IS. 
Individuals who previously fought in the ranks 
of IMU and IJU played an important role in the 
formation of the above organisations15. Groups 
made up of Central Asian militants have partic-
ipated in the most complex operations of the 
war (for instance, in the successful attempts to 
break the siege of Aleppo in August 2016)16. 
In contrast to the Chechens, particularly the 
Kists, the Central Asian militants are rarely com-
manders of jihadists groups. Some exceptions 
to this, along with the leaders of the Central 
Asian organisations, include Abu Ibrahim al 
Khorasani – former emir of the Jaesh al-Mu-
hajireen wal Ansar (which included militants 
from the entire post-Soviet area and in Sep-
tember 2015 joined Nusra)17 and colonel Gul-
murod Khalimov – former commander of the 
Tajik OMON, special militia unit – who joined 
the IS in 201518 and a year later became the mil-
itary commander of the Islamic State19, current-
ly commanding the defence of Mosul, amongst 
other responsibilities20. 
Contrary to the Central Asian states’ narrative, 
mass departures to Syria have so far not gener-
ated additional threats to the countries of the 
region. Furthermore, in the short and medium 
term perspective they are even beneficial – al-
lowing the most radicalised, dangerous indi-
viduals to be eliminated or at least removed. 
15 Ibidem.
16 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/uz-
bek-groups-part-of-new-offensive-in-southern-aleppo.
php
17 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=24140
18 http://www.umma-42.ru/news-60056.html
19 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/world/asia/tajiki-
stan-islamic-state-isis.html?_r=0
20 h t t p : / / w w w. r u d a w. n e t / e n g l i s h / m i d d l e e a s t /
iraq/30012017
Contrary to the Central Asian states’ nar-
rative, mass departures to Syria have so 
far not generated additional threats to 
the countries of the region.
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The case of IMU, and earlier Arab veterans of 
Afghan war, shows that the mass return of Cen-
tral Asian militants from Syria is rather impos-
sible, with a more probable option being their 
relocation to a new conflict, which poses cer-
tain risks and threats elsewhere yet does not 
do so for the states of origin21. Nevertheless, in 
the long term perspective the influx of militants 
to Syria may negatively influence the countries 
of the region, primarily through an interde-
pendence between the departures of militants 
for Syria and the growth of radical circles: on 
the one hand it was the growth of radical ten-
dencies (mainly a radical form of Salafism) that 
elicited such a large number of volunteers to 
Syria, whereas on the other hand mass partic-
ipation in the conflict there facilitates further 
propaganda and recruitment. Additionally, the 
war in Syria led to the establishment of a pe-
culiar conglomeration of the post-Soviet fight-
ers – a network of informal ties and contacts 
between particular circlesand groups, at times 
formally hostile towards each other. Therefore, 
if a serious crisis should erupt in Central Asia, it 
is possible that it would be exploited not only 
by the radical Islamic militants from the region, 
but from the entire post-Soviet area. 
Between Islamisation 
and authoritarianism 
Though the role of Islam is increasing in the 
Central Asian societies, the scale of the phe-
nomenon is often exaggerated. It also does not 
directly translate to radicalisation or an increase 
of the terrorist threat within the region. Rad-
icalised individuals, with very few exceptions, 
choose to leave the region for the countries 
where Islamic terrorist organisations are active 
(currently almost exclusively to Syria). The ac-
tions of the authorities of the regional states in 
this regards are most often counterproductive 
and lead to further escalation of the problem of 
radical Islamic militants from Central Asia. 
21 For more on the possibility of militants returning from 
Syria, see: Homo Jihadicus, op. cit. 
Since the Central Asian states gained their in-
dependence, the role of Islam in their societies, 
as well as the percentage of individuals en-
gaged in Islamic practices, is constantly rising. 
This is true for all the region’s states, even in-
cluding those such as Uzbekistan, where reli-
gious persecution is especially harsh. The oc-
currences of the above phenomena include, 
amongst other things, increasing participation 
in Islamic prayers, celebration of Islamic holi-
days, or a growing number of people observing 
the fast during Ramadan. There is no credible 
and comprehensive data, yet the above is still 
true for a minority. Most inhabitants of the 
region are still cultural Muslims22, not actively 
engaged in religion, which is a remnant of So-
viet social policy. The lack of continuity of the 
tradition means that, Islam is de facto a new re-
ligion for individuals who practice it. This leads 
to dynamic growth of the Salafist groups, with 
Salafism as such often being perceived as the 
most authentic and vibrant form of Islam23. 
Despite the limited scale of this phenomenon, 
governments of the regional states view the 
rising role of Islam in unequivocally negative 
terms and actively seek to counter it. This is 
accomplished through introducing limitations 
upon practicing religion, and even persecutions 
of groups independent from the official Islamic 
structures, often resulting in radicalisation of 
22 The Soviet form of Islam. Its essence is the identification 
of the professed faith with ethnicity – the perception 
and self-perception of the representatives of particu-
lar ethnic groups (for example Kazakhs, Azerbaijanis 
or Turkmens) as Muslims by definition, regardless of 
whether they practise Islam or possess any religious 
knowledge.
23 Further in: Homo Jihadicus, op. cit. 
The war in Syria led to the establish-
ment of a peculiar conglomeration of the 
post-Soviet fighters – a network of infor-
mal ties and contacts between particu-
lar circles and groups, at times formally 
hostile towards each other.
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the former. Such actions are often portrayed as 
part of the struggle against terrorism, which is 
aimed at giving them some form of legitima-
cy in the international arena, yet in practice 
they are also utilised to combat the opposition. 
A particular exception to this tactic is provid-
ed by Kazakhstan. Following the wave of ter-
rorist attacks in 2011 and 2012, perpetrated by 
local, atomised, grass-roots radical Salafists, 
the authorities have introduced a more com-
prehensive policy towards Salafism. In practice, 
it meant mass arrests of suspected radicals, si-
multaneously combined with support for the 
peaceful Salafi leaders, such as Rinat Abu Mu-
hammad al Kazakhstani (real name Rinat Zay-
nulin), a Salafi preacher well known throughout 
the entire post-Soviet area and often criticised 
by the radical Salafists24. 
The persecutions of independent Islam in the 
Central Asian states not only fail to solve the 
problem of radical Islamic militants, they in-
deed serve to exacerbate it. The discrimination 
against independent Islamic groups, combined 
with strong surveillance and an apparatus of 
oppression, leads to most of the radicalised in-
dividuals deciding to engage in terrorist activ-
ities outside of the region (with the exception 
of isolated grass-roots attacks in Kazakhstan). 
In this context, the departures for jihad in Syria, 
despite the narrative of threats arisingsteaming 
from them, are beneficial for the Central Asian 
states, which export the radicalised individuals 
abroad. Similar actions, yet on a larger scale, 
also took place in Russia, where the Russian 
security services at times went as far as ena-
24 For example: https://tavhid.com/forum/showthread.
php?tid=2999
bling Islamic radicals to leave for Syria (for ex-
ample, the case of a well-known Salafi leader 
Nadir Abu Khalid/Nadir Medetov)25. Along with 
the skilful playing out of the Caucasus Emirate 
– Islamic State rivalry, the above allowed for 
an almost complete neutralisation of the Islamic 
insurgency in the Northern Caucasus, with both 
seasoned militants and new recruits leaving 
for Syria. 
Perspectives 
Up to the present date, the mechanisms de-
scribed above allowed Central Asia to avoid the 
problem of Islamic terrorism, by transferring 
it outside of the region. The events of the last 
year show that this model is exhausting itself. 
While it still exports risks abroad, it ceases to 
protect the region’s states or Russia. Taking into 
account the dynamic of the events in Syria, the 
radical Islamic militants from Central Asia also 
pose a threat for the NATO member states. 
The main threat for Central Asia and Russia lies 
in a continuation of the current policies while 
the key parameters change. These include: de-
teriorating socio-economic conditions, grow-
ing inefficiency of the state structures and the 
rise of radical Islamic ideas caused by the war 
in Syria, combined with the impossibility of 
a mass outflow to Syria to be sustained26. 
The rise in activity of the Islamic radicals in the 
region is a result of a lack of policy. Examples 
of it include: the August 2016 attack on the 
Chinese embassy in Bishkek27, the latest attack 
in Saint Petersburg28 or the attack carried out 
25 Further in: Homo Jihadicus, op. cit. 
26 Which is caused by Islamic State losing its access to the 
Turkish border, the losses of the Sunni opposition and 
the change in Turkey’s policy towards Islamic State. 
27 Suicide attack (3 people wounded) perpetrated by the 
Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIM), previously 
linked to IMU and IJU, currently based in Syria and coop-
erating with Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad. The attacker was 
an ethnic Uighur with Tajik citizenship; http://svodka.
akipress.org/news:1327985
28 The perpetrator of which, Akbarjon Jalilov, Russian citi-
zen, ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan’s Osh, probably act-
ed alone. 
The persecutions of independent Islam in 
the Central Asian states not only fail to 
solve the problem of radical Islamic mili-
tants, they indeed serve to exacerbate it.
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by Islamic radicals on the internal troop base in 
Aktobe in June 201629. Russia and Kazakhstan 
seem to be the most endangered countries. 
Currently in Russia at least 3 million Central 
Asian labour migrants are present, while addi-
tionally Chechnya is starting to face a new radi-
cal Islamic insurgency, operating under the ban-
ner of Islamic State, and having no ties to the 
previous Caucasus Emirate linked insurgency. 
In the western region of Kazakhstan, a danger-
ous process of criminal structures and Salafi 
groups melding into one may be observed, 
which even now cyclically generates tensions. 
Taking into consideration the negative eco-
nomic situation and the peculiarities of this 
part of the country, the problem may lead to 
destabilisation in the future. In the case of oth-
er countries of the region, especially Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan, the degree of repression and 
surveillance over society most likely hinder 
the direct threats arising from the actions of 
the radical Islamic militants. Simultaneously, 
a number of structural factors potentially kin-
dle the destabilisation of these states, which in 
return would probably be exploited by the or-
ganisations that originated in the region30. 
The activity of terrorists from Central Asia also 
poses threats to Western countries. An exam-
ple of this may be seen in the attack carried 
out in Stockholm on April 7th, the perpetrator of 
which is a citizen of Uzbekistan, most probably 
being under the influence of Islamic State prop-
aganda but not a member of its structures31. 
However, the primary threat remains in regard 
to the areas of armed conflict. Radical Islamic 
29 The attack led to 19 fatalities (including 13 attackers). 
The attack was launched spontaneously by grass-roots 
radicalised Salafists. Further in: A. Jarosiewicz, Military 
clashes in Kazakhstan, OSW Analyses, 8.06.2016, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-06-08/
military-clashes-kazakhstan. 
30  Further in: M. Falkowski, J. Lang, Hostages to Moscow, 
clients of Beijing. Security in Central Asia as the role of 
the West diminishes, OSW Studies, 28.10.2014. https://
www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_51_ang_hos-
tages_to_moscow_3.pdf 
31 http://www.independent.co.uk /news/world/europe/
stockholm-attack-latest-killed-shots-fired-lorry-truck-
ahlens-mall-crash-crowd-sweden-people-a7672636.
html 
militants from Central Asia have fought against 
ISAF troops in Afghanistan, and are currently 
fighting within the ranks of the Islamic State, 
which is under attack by the international coali-
tion. The above groups also have some abilities 
to engage in terrorist activity within the NATO 
states. In this regard Turkey is the most vulner-
able country.  Since Turkey has changed its pol-
icy towards Islamic State, the organisation has 
launched several terrorist attacks in Turkey, per-
petrators of which were often Islamic radicals 
from Central Asia. Examples of this include the 
attack on Istanbul airport on June 28th 2016, 
which resulted in 230 casualties, including 
45 dead, or the attack on Istanbul’s Reina night 
club on 1 of January 2017, where 39 people 
were killed32. 
The Reina club attack shows also another dan-
gerous trend – Turkish authorities have accused 
foreign intelligence services33, unofficially Syri-
an intelligence34, of inspiring the attack (which 
was not a suicide attack – the assailant was lat-
ter caught35). The losses of Islamic State, com-
bined with inability to return to the countries 
of origin, may drive some of the Islamic radi-
cals from Central Asia, who, due to the war in 
32 ht tp: / / w w w.voanews .com /a / turkey - makes -a r -
rests-in-raids-targeting-suspected-islamic-state-mem-
bers/3398394.html 
33 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-at-
tacks-idUSKBN150113. The validity of the claim seems to 
be supported by the fact that US$ 200,000 in cash was 
found in the possession of Masharipov, which is uncom-
mon amongst individuals acting on behalf of terrorist 
organisations with ideology being the driving force. 
34 https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/01/12/
is-syrian-intelligence-behind-daesh-attacks-in-turkey
35 Abdulgadir Masharipov, citizen of Uzbekistan, in the 
past he has fought in Afghanistan (probably in the ranks 
of IMU) and later in Syria; https://www.dailysabah.com/
war-on-terror/2017/01/16/reina-nightclub-attacker-
who-killed-39-nabbed-in-istanbul 
The departures for jihad in Syria, de-
spite the narrative of threats arising from 
them, are beneficial for the Central Asian 
states, which export the radicalised indi-
viduals abroad.
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Syria, gained both combat experience and con-
tacts in various groups throughout the region, 
to engage in terrorist action commercially – as 
mercenaries for other terrorist organisations 
or intelligence services. One example of such 
commercialisation of Jihad might be the so-
called Malhama Tactical, which was formed by 
Central Asian militants. The group is active in 
conducting subcontracting (training, combat 
actions etc.) on a commercial basis for terror-
ist organisations present in Syria36, positioning 
itself as “Jihadi Blackwater” 37. The founder of 
the group was an Uzbek militant – Abu Rofik 
– who in the past has served in the Russian Air-
borne Troops, which pinpoints another danger-
ous trait of Central Asian militants – tradition-
ally amongst them there is a high percentage 
of individuals who either underwent military 
service, are veterans of prior armed conflicts38, 
36 Further in: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/10/
the-world-first-jihadi-private-military-contractor-syr-
ia-russia-malhama-tactical/ 
37 For example well established presence in the social me-
dia: https://vk.com/malhama_t; https://www.instagram.
com/malhama__tactical/; https://www.youtube.com/
channel/UC9V9z1z9qveqRArjzb5iMew/videos 
38 For example, one of IMU’s founders, Juma Namanga-
ni, was a Soviet veteran of the Afghan war, where he 
fought while serving in the Soviet Airborne Troops. 
or were even part of the professional security 
apparatus39. This results in the advanced com-
bat skills that the Central Asian radical Islamic 
militants demonstrate. 
The situation described above may pose 
a threat for other countries also, including the 
UE states, independent of the present phenom-
enon of European Islamic terrorism. Especially 
worrisome in the European context are the links 
developed during the Syrian war between the 
Central Asian radicals and the Chechen commu-
nity in Europe and Turkey, heavily infiltrated by 
Ramzan Kadyrov’s security services40.
39 For example, the above-mentioned Gulmurod Khalimov, 
who, as commander of the OMON unit, underwent 
special training in USA and Russia; https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/28/the-
u-s-trained-commander-of-tajikistans-special-forces-
has-joined-the-islamic-state/?utm_term=.6028c525fd14 
40 http://memohrc.org/monitorings/pravozashchitni-
ki-konstatirovali-usilenie-vliyaniya-kadyrova-na-chech-
enskie-diaspory
